Suitable Constitution

CONTINUED FROM LAST WEEK

In view of all that we have said, and specifically in order to protect the inalienable rights of the indigenous Lagosians in particular, to assuage the feelings of Yoruba people in general, and to allay the fears of non- Yoruba Nigerians, we strongly urge that the claim by the Yoruba for a merger of Lagos with Western Nigeria, and that by non-Yoruba Nigerians for Lagos to continue as a Federal Territory, should both be abandoned. And we propose that Lagos should be converted into a separate constituent State, instead.

A Lagos constituent State which is only conterminous with the present jurisdiction of the Lagos City Council will be as viable as any State in the world. But the future development and expansion of Lagos as a major Nigerian port, not to mention its importance as the Federal Capital, demand that, if possible, portions of the adjoining territory of Western Nigeria, such as Ajerorni District Council Area, and parts of Ikeja Division, should be merged with the L. C. C. area to form a Lagos constituent State.

As long as Lagos remains the capital of Nigeria, the Central Government must of a necessity have a special interest in the physical development of the Territory as well as in the kind of relationship which exists between it and the Authority in charge of the administration of Lagos. The problems which will thus arise should not be too difficult to solve. There are many successful precedents. Among them are Ottawa, Moscow, Bonn, and Belgrade.

It only remains for us to emphasize that in organizing Lagos together with Ajerorni District Council Area and parts of Ikeja Division into a new constituent State, a nlebiscite should be conducted in the areas which it is proposed she ild be included in the said State.

SIXTH: The demand for the merger of the Yoruba tribes in IIorin and Kabba Divisions with the rest of Yorubaland is a long-standing one. Since they are Yoruba, they automatically belong to Western Nigeria under the multi-lingual principle. But the dominant Hausal Fulani of the Northern Region lay claim to these areas and the people therein, on the strength of their alleged military conquest some 146 years ago. The British, in pursuit of their selfish imperialist interests, recognized this spurious claim. But today, we do not think that any enlightened and intelligent member of the Hausa-Fulani national group will insist on this preposterous, insulting, and false claim. In the circumstance, it is unnecessary to demonstrate the historical falsity, or the political injudiciousness, of the claim.

In keeping. however, with our third principle on the subject, a plebiscite should be held in the two divisions of IIorin and Kabba to determine whether or not the people do truly desire to remain where they are, or to be merged with Western Nigeria. We now come to the important issue of division of functions as between the composite and the constituent State. We are of the opinion that this should be done so as to vest:

(1) certain specified powers exclusively in the Central Authority;

(2) certain specified powers concurrently in the Central and Regional Authorities; and

(3) residual powers exclusively in the Regional Authorities.

There are a few protagonists of a Unitary Constitution for Nigeria who care prepared to tolerate or even support a Federal Constitution, if the above order is reversed and residuary functions are vested exclusively in the Central Authority. As we have seen, Canada is a good precedent for this procedure. But, in this connection, we are in honesty bound to point out that some political analysts have reported that the Canadian arrangement has led to a lot of friction between the Central and Provincial Authorities, and that there is a clear tendency that the latter are winning, and waxing stronger at the expense of the Central Authority.

Be that as it may, our considered view is that Nigeria should keep in step, in this matter, with the U.S.A.,Australia, Switzerland, and such-like countries. Besides, on merit, it is more desirable and wiser to vest residuary functions in the constituent States. We have three reasons in support of this proposition.

Firstly, whilst by the exercise of reasonable prudence and foresight one could draw up a comprehensive list of subjects for the composite State, which will hold good for half a century or more hence, one would need the divine gift of prophecy to do the same in respect of a constituent State list of subjects. For instance, omissions were discovered in the Regional list of the Macpherson Constitution three months after its introduction. It took much longer than that time to supply the omissions.

Secondly, since matters on the Exclusive Federal List are invariably of country-wide interest, any required addition to the list can be much more easily inserted by amendment to the constitution, than would be the case in regard to subjects in the constituent State list, which are usually of local interest. Here, it must be emphasized that ‘local interest’ means what it says. What is of vital interest to one constituent State may be unheard of in, or even anathema to, the other constituent States. Now, if such an amendment to the Constitution is to be made with the concurrence of the people in a referendum, then unless a matter of interest to a constituent State is, at the same time, of interest to all or a majority of the other constituent States, an amendment to the Constitution to let it in would be almost impossible.

Thirdly, as the fountain of financial resources for all the Governments of the country, the Central Authority is in a powerful and unique position. It can, as other Central Authorities are wont to do, use its financial power to exercise forceful or even forcible persuasive influence on the constituent States to get what it wants. No constituent State can ever enjoy this felicitous position of influence on the other constituent States, let alone on the Central Government.

CONTINUES NEXT WEEK