THE Federal Government’s plan to reintegrate hundreds of “repentant” terrorists into society raises serious questions about both its timing and structure. In a recent disclosure, the government indicated that it plans to reintegrate close to 800 such individuals. This should provoke serious national reflection. While acknowledging that rehabilitation is a necessary component of modern counterinsurgency, it must also be noted that the current approach risks undermining justice, weakening deterrence, and damaging troop morale.
This is not because the idea of rehabilitation is inherently wrong. No serious nation fights insurgency without, at some point, creating a pathway for disengagement. But timing, structure, and sincerity matter. And in Nigeria’s case, those elements appear dangerously misaligned. The policy, which began under the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari and has continued under President Bola Tinubu, is now entering a phase that raises more questions than answers. At a time when terrorists are emboldened enough to demand billions in ransom, when communities in the North-East still live under threat, and when soldiers continue to fall in the line of duty, the optics and the substance of reintegrating former fighters into society deserve closer scrutiny.
We have to be honest with ourselves. What exactly is the benchmark for “repentance” in a conflict where brutality has been consistent and deliberate? These are not petty offenders who stumbled into crime. These are individuals who, in many cases, participated in acts that shocked even the conscience of a hardened world: killings, abductions, and the destruction of entire communities. If a man drops his weapon today and claims remorse, is that repentance, or simply exhaustion? Is it conviction or convenience? These are not academic questions; they go to the heart of national security. This is because, if the process of determining repentance is weak, then reintegration becomes a risk multiplier. It raises legitimate concerns: What systems are in place to monitor these individuals after reintegration? What economic structures sustain them, so they do not drift back into violence? What prevents them from becoming intelligence assets for the very networks they once served?
A society that cannot answer these questions clearly is not reintegrating: it is gambling. Even more troubling is the messages this sends to those who have borne the cost of this war. Across the country are families who have buried loved ones: soldiers, policemen, and civilians killed by the same insurgents now being considered for reintegration. There are widows who remember the last phone call. There are children growing up without fathers. There are wounded officers who carry the scars of encounters that the rest of society debates from a distance. What does this policy say to them? Morale in any fighting force is not sustained by weapons alone. It is sustained by a sense of justice: that sacrifice is recognised, and that those who inflict harm are held accountable. When that balance appears tilted, even perception can become corrosive. It is, therefore, not surprising that the deradicalisation programme under Operation Safe Corridor is now under increasing scrutiny. Originally, the programme was designed to target those who were forcefully recruited, individuals who, by circumstance rather than conviction, found themselves within insurgent ranks. They were to be rehabilitated and returned to their local government areas for reintegration.
But reality has not been that tidy. Many local communities have resisted accepting these individuals back, citing fear, mistrust, and the absence of guarantees. And no one can dismiss those fears lightly. Reintegration is not a policy on paper, it is a lived experience in fragile communities. There is also the legal dimension. Nigeria does not lack laws to prosecute terrorism. The Terrorism (Prevention) Act provides a clear framework for trying offenders. The real challenge has been capacity: insufficient judges, slow trials, and a system that struggles under the weight of complex cases. The proposal for special courts has surfaced repeatedly, but constitutional constraints, particularly the requirements of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, have slowed that path. Yet, this should not become an excuse for inaction. If justice is slow, then the answer is to strengthen the system: assign more judges, create dedicated divisions, and expedite trials. Justice delayed, in a conflict like this, does more than frustrate victims: it emboldens perpetrators. And that emboldenment is already visible.
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Terrorists release videos of torture without hesitation. They operate with a level of psychological confidence that suggests they do not fear consequences in any immediate sense. When trials are distant and accountability uncertain, deterrence weakens. There are also disturbing reports–some difficult to verify but persistent–about attempts in the past to integrate former insurgents into formal structures, even the military. Whether exaggerated or not, such narratives deepen public distrust. It must also be clearly stated that for those who may have, in the past, silently facilitated such reintegration into government structures without formal directives, particularly in cases where such individuals are deemed unfit for civil or public service: there will inevitably be consequences. Actions taken on sentiment, outside the bounds of law and policy, carry future legal risks. The State cannot afford a situation where individuals involved in grave crimes are quietly reintroduced into sensitive systems without accountability.
This is because at its core, the question Nigerians are asking is simple: Are we confronting this threat decisively, or managing it indefinitely? The issue becomes even more complicated when the fact is considered that not all those being processed are Nigerians. If foreign fighters are indeed part of the pool, then the problem expands beyond reintegration. It becomes one of sovereignty, intelligence, and cross-border accountability. Meanwhile, deeper structural issues remain unaddressed: the Almajiri system continues to produce a pool of vulnerable, unstructured youth, easy targets for recruitment. In some quarters, there are allegations, again difficult to prove but persistent, that political actors benefit from instability, exploiting ungoverned spaces during elections. If even a fraction of this is true, then the problem is no longer just security, it is systemic. And that is where honesty must prevail.
No parent will willingly encourage a child to join a military where the lines between enemy and beneficiary appear blurred. No community will embrace reintegration without trust. And no nation can win a war where justice appears negotiable. This is not an argument against rehabilitation; it is an argument for balance. Those who were coerced, especially minors or non-combatants, deserve structured rehabilitation. But those who committed grave crimes must pass through a visible, credible legal process. Mercy, where appropriate, must follow justice, not replace it. Nigeria does not need to abandon its deradicalisation efforts. But it must reappraise, recalibrate, and reinforce them. Because a war is not won only on the battlefield. It is won in the courts, in the communities, and in the conscience of the nation. And until justice, deterrence, and reintegration are aligned, the country may continue to fight without truly finishing the fight.
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