State police: Time for constitutional action

PRESIDENT Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s appeal to the Senate on February 25, 2026, to “tinker with the constitution” to accommodate State Police marks the second such call in three months. Earlier, on November 26, 2025, while declaring a nationwide security emergency and ordering expanded recruitment across the armed forces, the president acknowledged that states capable of establishing their own police services should be enabled to do so within a clear constitutional framework. We commend the president’s expressed commitment to restructuring Nigeria’s policing architecture. The urgency of reform is evident.

Despite the security emergency declaration and measures such as the recruitment of 50,000 additional federal security personnel, deployment of forest guards, and expanded operational directives, insecurity has persisted across several regions. Reports indicated continued mass casualty incidents, renewed abductions, attacks on military formations, and sustained violence and attacks in states such as Oyo, Ondo, Kwara, Zamfara, Borno, and Benue.  Terrorism, banditry, kidnapping and organised crime have exposed the structural limits of a single, centrally controlled police system operating across a vast and heterogeneous federation. Recruitment alone, without institutional redesign, cannot permanently resolve a problem rooted in governance architecture. The question before the National Assembly is therefore no longer whether subnational policing is desirable, but how to deliberately and properly structure it constitutionally.

If state police is to proceed from political rhetoric to institutional reform, it must proceed beyond rhetoric or playing to the gallery. Intentional actions must be taken on the constitutional architecture. What is required is a formation of a presidential committee, working in consultations with the state governments, civil societies and other relevant stakeholders around the country to carefully draft an amendment bill that defines powers, funding, oversight, and the operational relationship between Federal and state police services. Then present such a presidential bill to the National Assembly. The National Assembly can then follow necessary parliamentary procedures to amend the constitution.  Any serious state police reform must therefore amend: Section 214(1) to permit subnational police services, the Exclusive Legislative List (Second Schedule, Part I), to transfer policing to the Concurrent List, Sections 215 and 216, to redefine command and operational authority, and the constitutional provisions, and federal laws and regulations, governing the Nigeria Police Council and Police Service Commission, to accommodate federal–state coordination and oversight mechanisms.

Without these textual changes, state policing remains mere desire. However, decentralisation alone does not guarantee security. Poorly designed state police systems could introduce new risks: political misuse, jurisdictional conflicts, funding disparities, and uneven professional standards.  Therefore, the design should be properly structured. First, constitutional clarity is essential. Federal police must retain responsibility for terrorism, interstate crimes, cybercrime, organised transnational offences, border security, and protection of critical national assets. State police would focus on community policing, intelligence gathering, forest surveillance, and rapid response within state boundaries. Clear jurisdictional demarcation prevents rivalry and duplication. Second, oversight mechanisms must be robust. A restructured Police Service Commission framework, with federal and state arms operating under defined standards, could regulate recruitment, discipline, and training. National minimum benchmarks must apply across all policing tiers to preserve professionalism and human rights protections.

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Third, funding must be sustainable. Many states already provide vehicles, logistics and allowances to federal security agencies operating within their territories. Constitutional authority would allow these expenditures to be institutionalised into structured state policing services. However, federalism permits asymmetry. States that lack fiscal capacity or political readiness should not be compelled to establish state police. Adoption may be voluntary, subject to constitutional safeguards. Global examples demonstrate flexibility. In Canada, some provinces operate their own police services while others rely on federal policing arrangements. In the United States, federal, state and local policing layers coexist within clearly defined jurisdictional boundaries. Nigeria need not replicate any model wholesale, but it must adapt structural principles suited to its federal character and diversity.

Fourth, safeguards against abuse are non-negotiable. State police must not become instruments of partisan intimidation. Constitutional protections, independent complaints mechanisms, judicial oversight, and limited federal intervention powers in exceptional circumstances may be necessary. Professional training, merit-based recruitment, and intelligence-sharing frameworks must be codified from inception. An additional pathway worth exploring is structured and coordinated regional policing, building upon existing zonal security initiatives such as Amotekun. Regional frameworks may offer scale advantages with the regional development commission, and reduce fragmentation risks while preserving local responsiveness.

The president’s November 26 security emergency declaration acknowledged that the security architecture must evolve. His recent appeal to the Senate to initiate constitutional amendment is therefore a logical progression.  But appeals alone are insufficient. What Nigeria requires now is a formally drafted constitutional amendment bill, accompanied by fiscal modelling, institutional design proposals, and a clearly articulated federal–state interface. Security reform is a matter of structure. Centralisation has shown its limits. Yet decentralisation without discipline would merely multiply weaknesses. The path forward lies in constitutional clarity, institutional safeguards, and deliberate design.

If Nigeria is to confront terrorism, reclaim its forests and restore citizens’ confidence, policing reform must be engineered carefully within the framework of the law.  The time for lip service has passed. It is time for constitutional action to begin.