Questions raised by the Flydubai attack

In October 2010, British Airways captain Robert Brown killed his estranged wife, Joanna Simpson.

The following day, he was scheduled to command a Boeing 747 from Heathrow to Lagos. Brown called in sick and another pilot operated the flight.

During his subsequent trial, he told the court that he had contemplated flying the aircraft to Lagos and crashing it there.

What made the case particularly disturbing was that his intention had not been detected before he was due to fly. It became known only because he disclosed it during his trial. His decision to call in sick prevented the plan from progressing, but the danger had gone undetected.

The flight never became an aviation disaster. But the case demonstrated a vulnerability that has confronted the industry repeatedly. The person authorised to operate an aircraft can also become a threat to it.

That concern has taken on a more immediate form with the attack on the captain of Flydubai Flight FZ1073.

The United Arab Emirates Attorney-General, Dr Hamad Saif Al Shamsi, said investigations had established that the co-pilot attacked the captain with a crash axe and attempted to take control of the aircraft in what he described as an attempted “terrorist act”.

Investigators are examining the motive, the circumstances of the attack and whether there were any related connections.

If the co-pilot deliberately attempted to seize the aircraft for a terrorist purpose, the incident would represent an especially serious form of aviation insider threat. He was not attempting to breach airport security or force his way into the cockpit. He was already there, authorised to fly the aircraft.

That makes reports about his previous professional history relevant to the investigation.

Several reports have identified the co-pilot as Omani national Hamam al-Hammami and said he had previously been barred from flying in Oman because of concerns about extremist views. Other reports have described restrictions on his flying duties and subsequent aviation-related roles.

UAE authorities have not publicly confirmed his identity, while the reported history remains subject to investigation.

If the reported restriction is confirmed, investigators will need to establish why it was imposed, who imposed it, what effect it had on his pilot licence or employment, whether it was subsequently lifted and what information was available to authorities and airlines that dealt with him afterwards.

That leads to one of the most important questions raised by the incident. Can security information about aviation personnel reliably follow them when they move between employers and countries?

ICAO guidance on insider threats calls for background checks, recurrent checks and continuous vetting, including cooperation with authorities in other States where appropriate. The practical difficulty is ensuring that such safeguards continue to work when a pilot changes employers or crosses borders.

An airline recruitment process can establish qualifications, flying experience, medical certification and previous employment. A national security authority or previous employer may nevertheless hold information that does not appear in those records.

If a pilot is formally restricted or barred from flying because of a substantiated security concern, there needs to be a reliable mechanism for that information to reach the regulator responsible for the pilot’s subsequent licence or operational authority.

The circumstances surrounding the reported restriction in Oman should therefore be examined closely, including what was recorded, who could access it and what happened when the pilot entered another aviation system.

Reports have linked the co-pilot to Royal Air Maroc, but the Moroccan airline said he underwent three months of training there in 2025 and that his subsequent application to work for the airline was rejected. The airline said he never had an employment or contractual relationship with it.

READ ALSO: ‘How Flydubai flight managed to land safely after co-pilot stabbed pilot mid-air’

Australian authorities are separately investigating his links to the country.

The answers should establish whether any relevant security information existed, where it was recorded, who could access it and whether it was considered when the pilot sought aviation-related roles elsewhere.

The Flydubai case should also be considered alongside earlier incidents that exposed different forms of insider risk.

On March 24, 2015, Germanwings Flight 9525 crashed into the French Alps after co-pilot Andreas Lubitz deliberately continued the aircraft’s descent while the captain was locked out of the cockpit. All 150 people aboard were killed.

The disaster led to extensive reviews of pilot medical fitness, psychological assessment, confidentiality and reporting arrangements.

European aviation authorities subsequently recommended stronger psychological assessment and support systems, together with improved arrangements for sharing relevant aeromedical information while protecting confidentiality.

Germanwings demonstrated the danger of a pilot deliberately concealing a serious personal problem. Flydubai raises a different possibility, that relevant security information may already exist outside the system responsible for a pilot’s subsequent employment.

The difference is important because medical and psychological screening cannot, by itself, establish that a pilot presents no security threat. Nor should every troubled pilot be treated as a terrorist.

On April 7, 1994, Auburn Calloway, an off-duty Federal Express employee travelling as a jump-seat passenger, attacked the three-member crew of Flight 705 with hammers and a spear gun. The pilots fought him off and returned the aircraft safely to Memphis despite sustaining serious injuries.

Calloway was not one of the pilots operating the aircraft, but he was an airline employee with legitimate access and knowledge of airline operations.

The Flydubai incident presents a more direct vulnerability because the alleged attacker was one of the two people entrusted with operating the aircraft.

Flight FZ1073 was travelling from Dubai to Tel Aviv on September 30 when the attack occurred. The aircraft experienced a sharp descent before control was recovered. The injured captain managed to open the cockpit door, allowing others to intervene, while a reserve Flydubai pilot helped take control. The aircraft was diverted to Tabuk in Saudi Arabia, where it landed safely.

Reports put the number of people aboard at more than 170. Captain Smit Machchhar was seriously injured but was later reported to be in good condition and receiving medical treatment.

The circumstances of the flight also raise a separate operational question. What happens when the threat comes from a member of the flight crew?

The crash axe allegedly used in the attack was emergency equipment inside the cockpit. It did not have to pass through passenger screening or be smuggled aboard.

Airlines and regulators will need to examine whether existing emergency procedures adequately anticipate an attack by one pilot on another. That includes communication between the cockpit and cabin, procedures for gaining access to the flight deck when the remaining pilot is injured or incapacitated, cabin-crew training and arrangements for maintaining control when an authorised flight crew member becomes the aggressor.

The aim should not be to weaken cockpit security measures introduced to prevent hijacking and terrorist intrusion. It should be to ensure that those measures also work when the threat is already inside.

Investigators will ultimately have to determine whether the reported history had any bearing on the attack and whether existing safeguards worked as intended. The UAE has described the incident as an attempted terrorist act, but the investigation still has to establish the motive, preparation, ideology and any possible links behind it.

The Brown case showed that a pilot could contemplate using a passenger aircraft as a weapon without that intention being detected before he was due to fly. Germanwings showed the limits of medical and psychological safeguards. FedEx Flight 705 demonstrated how legitimate airline access could itself become a vulnerability.

Flydubai brings these concerns together in a particularly stark way. If the reported security history is confirmed, the investigation will have to determine not only what happened inside Flight FZ1073, but whether information that might have altered the decision to place the pilot in that cockpit was already available somewhere outside it.

A terrorist does not necessarily need to smuggle a weapon through an airport or force open a cockpit door.

In the most serious scenario, the person may already have been given the uniform, the security clearance, the cockpit access and the authority to fly.

Ladigbolu is a journalist based in Lagos.