SINCE members of Niger’s presidential guard struck on July 26, deposing President Mohamed Bazoum in a coup d’etat, there has been crisis in the country and the West African subregion. Shortly after the president’s detention, the mutineers appeared on national television to announce that they had overthrown the government. The army spokesman, Colonel-Major Amadou Abdramane, declared that the country’s borders had been closed and a nationwide curfew imposed while all institutions of the country had been suspended. Following the putsch, Abdourahmane Tchiani, head of the presidential guard, named himself the “president of the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland”, hinging the munity on the need to avoid “the gradual and inevitable demise” of the country, and declaring that the constitution had been suspended.
In Niamey, supporters of the coup gathered in front of the National Assembly, denouncing Bazoum and his government. Indeed, some excited supporters stormed the headquarters of the ruling party, the Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism, and set it on fire. The mutineers also engaged in a show of strength on the streets of Niamey, joined by enthusiastic crowds. However, in his first statement since the coup, Bazoum vowed that Niger’s hard-won democratic gains would be safeguarded, adding that “all Nigeriens who love democracy and freedom would want this.” His position was echoed by the country’s Foreign Minister, Hassoumi Massoudou, who called on all democrats and patriots to make what he called the military’s “perilous adventure” to fail.
Commendably, the reaction of the regional bloc, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) led by President Bola Tinubu, and the African Union (AU), were swift. ECOWAS called on the plotters to free Bazoum, while the AU urged them to return to the barracks immediately. The AU then handed down a 15-day ultimatum to the mutineers. In the same vein, the United States, France, Germany, the European Union and the United Nations also condemned the coup, welcoming the initiatives taken by ECOWAS to mediate in the crisis. They also cut off financial support to the country. The EU had allocated 503 million euros over the 2021-2024 period. French development aid for Niger, approximately 120 million euros ($130m) in 2022, was expected to increase this year. The Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) cancelled a $51m bond issuance by Niger, while Nigeria has since cut off power supply to the country.
As ECOWAS leaders met in Abuja over the crisis, the mutineers warned against any armed intervention. Colonel Amadou Abdramane, the military spokesperson, said: “We want to once more remind ECOWAS or any other adventurer of our firm determination to defend our homeland.” The junta also reopened the country’s borders with Mali, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Libya and Chad. This was just as ECOWAS declared that it would take all necessary measures, including force, to restore constitutional order. On the other hand, the rogue military regimes in Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali issued statements backing the Nigerien military, warning of dire consequences for ECOWAS should it try to reinstall Bezoum in power. Still, peace moves are continuing across the West African subregion. For instance, the Chadian president, Mahamat Idriss Deby, met with the mutineers and the deposed President Bazoum in an effort to broker peace. In the same vein, an ECOWAS delegation led by General Abdulsalami Abubakar, former military Head of State, arrived in Niamey on Wednesday to negotiate with the military junta. Abdulsalami was accompanied by Muhammadu Abubakar, the Sultan of Sokoto, and Alieu Touray, president of the ECOWAS commission.
Indeed, the coup in Niger, the fourth of such attempt within the West African subregion in the last three years, with the earlier three proceeding successfully, ought to sensitise leaders of thought and government under ECOWAS to the fragility of democratic practice in the West African region. The fragility could be in the form of lack of proper democratic conduct, leading to deficiencies in the legitimacy of the democratic structures, or the improper development and socialisation of the armed forces of the countries, necessitating the need to address these fundamental issues rather than simply bemoaning the apparent rollback ofdemocratic practice and expecting any concrete change on its own. This means that stakeholders ought to take seriously, the task of working for the real enthronement and practice of democracy in the region, rather than pretending to have democracy while rigging elections, violating rule of law, and imposing draconian, illegal and totalitarian changes to the constitution. Certainly, members of the armed forces have to be socialised into accepting the supremacy of civilian democratic rule and the need to allow civilians to sort out disagreements and contentions through democratic means rathet than seeking to impose themselves on governance by means of the barrel of the gun. In any case, if experience has shown anything over the years, it is the fact that military coups on the African continent are not necessarily about good governance or welfare of the people; they are about the mutineer’s craving for relevance in the political space and the intention to carve a niche for themselves. The cycle of military coups that ended with the eventual restoration of civil rule in many African countries did not suddenly catapult those countries into prosperity and, in any case, most of the promises made by the military goons turned out to be faker than a forged certificate.
It must be said nonetheless that the propensity for the armed forces to exploit crisis under democratic rule as a springboard for military coups rises and is enhanced when politicians stubbornly seek to illegally dominate the process through a recourse to unconstitutional actions, making it possible for soldiers to see the possibility of ascribing higher justification to their own brand of illegal domination. Humanity has not produced a better form of government than democracy, but mismanagement and unconstitutional acts by leaders under democratic rule end up violating the notion, thus giving military adventurers fillip. There is, therefore, a need for the West African subregion to be part of the global rules of democracy. It should reflect on the way democracy is practised meaningfully and in an orderly manner, and not just seek to mobilise against military interventions when they occur while not mobilising against undemocratic acts by civilian rulers.
We expect ECOWAS leaders to take all of this into consideration and imbibe important lessons from it in their response to the new attempt in Niger, and as they seek to arrest the slide of democratic rule in the subregion.