It would be a shame if the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) should eventually lose the three prominent Sahel States of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso. The withdrawal of these countries from ECOWAS, forming the ‘Sahel Alliance’ will have diplomatic, geopolitical, and security implications for West Africa and Nigeria in particular.
Firstly, the departure of these countries will lead to a shift in the geopolitical dynamics within West Africa, affecting the balance of power and influence among the remaining ECOWAS member states. This means that the region is divided along global politics and control of both land, water, and airspace. The West have major prominence in the remaining states while Putin has been alleged to be the power backbone for the Sahel brothers. Would the resurrection of Russia extend from Africa via the Sahel? These three states are indeed landlocked, but what about the airspace? Nigerian travellers to Europe fly through Niger. Would a new diplomatic arrangement be made going forward? What if the Sahel Alliance bans Nigeria from using its flight zone? These new times would surely have an effect on border and migration patterns, with potential implications for stability and demographic shifts in the affected countries.
Of interest to me and international security managers is the fact that out of the 5 states of Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger, 3 are against ECOWAS and 2 are against the Sahel Alliance. By inference, just two states are left in ECOWAS: Chad and Mauritania. The two weaker fingers should be careful of interference, either encouraged by the other 3. Because the friend of my enemy is my enemy.
Secondly, none of these West African brothers, not even the Sahel, is free from the security challenges of the new wave of jihadism, either from Bokoharam, Ansar al-Dine; Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS); Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM); al-Mulathamun Battalion (al-Mourabitoun), among others. Given the security concerns in the Sahel region, the withdrawal will surely impact regional efforts to address shared security challenges, especially the five-nation anti-jihadist task force known as the G5 Sahel Group, set up in 2014 by Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger. This potentially would lead to a fragmentation of strategies in combating terrorism and transnational crime in the Sahel and West African regions.
Yes, these three states have lesser military strength when compared to others in the ECOMOG, but they are stronger within the Sahel. Mali (35,000 total active military and paramilitary personnel, including approximately 20,000 Malian Armed Forces soldiers made up of 2,000 Air Force, 5,000 Gendarmerie, and 10,000 National Guard). From available data, the Niger Army, which includes 33,000 personnel as of 2023, while the Burkina Faso has 12,000 (Army 7,000, Air 500, Gendarmerie 4,500).
The combined forces here are a total of 80,000 active military personnel. Compared to the combined force of Mauritania (31,540) and Chad (33,250), making 64,790. A strong team of 144,790 fighters divided into halves isn’t healthy to fight insecurity that even the five states put together could not.
Is the end of ECOWAS near? NOT NOW!
Yes, out of the 15 member states, three are gone. Remaining 12. No doubt, it could weaken ECOWAS as a regional organization and potentially open space for other regional groupings or external actors to exert influence in West Africa.
Is the Alliance of Sahel States an alternative to ECOWAS? NO and NEVER!
There will always be regional conflicts, and this is the time for ECOWAS to mediate and address political crises within West Africa in the spirit of Pan-Africanism.
Democracy is good. It’s a process. The question of whether it suits the African space can be contested. In contesting this by the junta, we can disagree to agree, and even in our disagreement, let’s remain brothers.
The three musketeers should return!
Adeolu Oyebode is a security expert from Ekiti State, Nigeria.
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