The People’s Republic: Constitutional basis

CONTINUED FROM LAST WEEK

BEFORE we proceed further, we would like to make three important observations for the purpose of further clarification.

First: In the contest between one family and another, or between one aggregation of families and another, it was possible that one became the victor over the other. In such circumstances, the victorious family or community would not hesitate to impose its will and dictates on the other. It would almost certainly appropriate all available land to itself in order to establish an effective dominance over the defeated group. In addition, the liberty of the vanquished would be arbitrarily circumscribed or totally destroyed for the benefit of the conquering family or community. In such an event, the defeated family or community might succumb completely to its conqueror, or, as was more natural and likely, would strive to regain its lost liberty by force and stratagems. At the same time, the victorious family or community would feel compelled to use force to maintain

its dominance. Whichever was the case, a state of social imbalance and discontent would arise in the resultant society, until the original wrongs were righted; unless of course the two groups – the conquering and the conquered – became so quickly and completely assimilated that the consanguine line of demarcation between them became obliterated with little loss of time.

Second: It was possible that two or more contending families or aggregations of families had felt tired of war and had entered into negotiations between themselves for the attainment of peace and for mutual defence against other hostile families or aggregations of families. In this circumstance, it is reasonable and safe to assume that the-contracting families or aggregations of families would rule out the possibility of each of them being a law unto itself within the union; but would ensure equality among them, and the preservation of the rights and freedoms which the members of the different families had enjoyed hitherto. They would regard such rights and freedoms as inalienable and indestructible. It is also reasonable to assume that some sort of arrangement would have had to be made whereby the existing patresfamiliarum would surrender their powers over their respective families to a new body or bodies, which would exercise such powers in the traditional spirit, style, and natural and undiscriminating affection of a paterfamilias. To this end, it would be considered essential to set up machinery for the making of laws, the adjudication of disputes and the enforcement of such laws and adjudications. The history of man during the past 4,000 years is replete with experiments aimed at evolving satisfying methods for the administration of the affairs of the amalgamated families, called the State. The problems which confronted the first negotiating families remain: the making of laws which will reflect the wishes of the people and promote their welfare and happiness; the impartial adjudication of disputes; and the firm and undiscriminating enforcement of all laws and adjudications.

Third: No family unit would have survived in which the paterfamilias was in the habit of maltreating the members of the family, discriminating in favour of one to the prejudice of another, or flouting or disregarding the views of the majority of the adult and able-bodied members on important issues. In other words, for the family unit to survive – and hence for the new aggregation of families to survive—either the adult and able-bodied members must have a direct say in the administration of the affairs of the family or community, or the paterfamilias or patresfamiliarum and the king at their head, must see to it that, in all they do, they reflect the wishes and promote the interests of each and all of the members of the aggregating families.

It is clear from all that we have said that the family, as an independent sovereign unit, is a precarious and nonviable entity,

and that it is the State or the aggregation of families alone which can properly and satisfactorily provide the conditions under which man can exercise his individual freedom, live a full and happy life, and enjoy the fruits of his labour.

What then is a State? And to what extent and under what arrangements does a person enjoy the full, political and social

objectives which we have just stated?

According to Salmond, ‘A State is an association of human beings established for the attainment of certain ends.’ ‘Keeton’s definition is more explicit than Salmond’s, and distinguishes a state more clearly from other human associations like partnerships, limited liability companies, clubs, etc. It runs as follows:

A state is an association of human beings, whose members are at least

considerable, occupying a defined territory, and united with the appearance of

permanence for political ends, for the achievement of which certain governmental institutions have been evolved.’

From these definitions, all the attributes of a state can be discerned. But only three of them deserve special attention here. A State must have:

(I) objectives – ‘political ends’;

(2) a government – ‘governmental institutions’; and

(3) a constitution.

The first two are obvious from the words of the definitions, whilst the third is necessarily implied. The definitions of government and constitution will make it absolutely clear that the existence of government necessarily implies the pre-existence of a constitution.

CONTINUES NEXT WEEK

YOU SHOULD NOT MISS THESE HEADLINES FROM NIGERIAN TRIBUNE