Constitutionality of suspension of elected public officers in a state (3)

It is clear from the above position of the Constitution that any State House of Assembly can be taken over by the National Assembly given the circumstances as prescribed in the Constitution, and in compliance with section 1 (2) thereof. This is as far as it goes. The Constitution nevertheless did not donate any power to the Federal Government to take over the executive arm of government by removing or suspending the elected Governor, Deputy Governor or other elected representatives of the people, under any guise whatsoever. As a matter of fact, to put the matter to rest, the Constitution added in the above underlined proviso that the powers of the National Assembly shall not be construed to remove the Governor or Deputy Governor of a state. If the National Assembly cannot do it, there is no basis for the President to claim such absolute power. One of the reasons for this is that such arbitrary or unilateral action of the President will interfere with the sacred mandate exercised by the people during election. Once the people of Rivers State in their wisdom have elected the Governor, their mandate cannot and should not be annulled capriciously through the fiat of the President. Consequently, the action of the President in removing the Governor, the Deputy Governor and other elected officials of Rivers State and the subsequent appointment of the Sole Administrator constitute a fragrant violation of section 1 (2) of the Constitution. The concept of a Sole Administrator is alien to the people of Rivers State and the mode of his ascension to the seat of power in Rivers State is alien to the Constitution. This should ordinarily be a straight forward matter but because of several vested interests, it has been politicised beyond legal considerations. And this is one of the challenges of our legal system, which has been bastardized on the wobbling altars of ethnicity and religion, to the extent that simple legal issues cannot be viewed and determined purely on the precinct of their legal status without being corrupted by other extraneous considerations.

Constitutional Alternative in the Absence of a House of Assembly

It is imperative to repeat that the failure of a House of Assembly to function in a state cannot be a justification for the dissolution of democratic structures of any part of the Nation. Indeed, the Constitution had envisaged that a state House of Assembly may not be able to function due to one reason or the other, hence section 11 (4) of the Constitution: At any time when any House of Assembly of a State is unable to perform its functions by reason of the situation prevailing in that State, the National Assembly may make such laws for the peace, order and good government of that State with respect to matters on which a House of Assembly may make laws as may appear to the National Assembly to be necessary or expedient until such time as the House of Assembly is able to resume its functions; and any such laws enacted by the National Assembly pursuant to this section shall have effect as if they were laws enacted by the House of Assembly of the State. (Emphasis Added).

The point being made here is that the Constitution in its wisdom provides for and allows that the House of Assembly be taken over and substituted, for the meantime by the National Assembly in the right circumstances, but clearly and deliberately did not say any of such concerning the office of the Governor or his Deputy (as important as those seats are) or indeed the other elected representatives of the people. Had the Constitution envisaged the removal of the Governor and the Deputy Governor, it would have stated the manner of the exercise of the functions of those offices in the event of such removal, the same way it did for the State House of Assembly. The President and indeed the Federal Government cannot assume powers not given or donated by the Constitution. See the case of ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BENDEL STATE V AIDEYAN (1989) 4 NWLR (PT 118) 187. The Federal Government under the leadership of the President was in court to argue the legality of suspension or removal of elected officials from office. The Supreme Court in its wisdom in the case of ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION V ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF ABIA STATE & ORS (2024) LPELR-62576 (SC) held that the removal of elected Chairmen and Councilors, as well as appointment of Sole Administrators or Caretaker Committees by the State Governors to run Local Government Councils are illegal and unconstitutional. It follows therefore that the suspension of an elected Governor, the Deputy Governor and elected members of the Houses of Assembly by the President is illegal and unconstitutional in every reasonable sense of the word.

Also, in the case of SPEAKER, BAUCHI STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY V HON. RIFKATU DANNA (2017) 49 WRN 82, the court held that the suspension of democratically elected officials/legislators is illegal and unconstitutional. The National Assembly’s approval/ratification of the President’s suspension of the Governor and his Deputy is contrary to section 1(2), 11 (4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 and hence illegal and void. If the framers of the Constitution had intended for such drastic measures, it would have explicitly stated so. If this federal system of government must survive and our democracy preserved, we must reject any attempt to undermine the state component structures and constituted authorities of this federation and the wanton suspension of elected officials to settle political scores with the opposition. The central government must respect the component government in line with the Constitution and not embark upon desperate resort to emergency powers to settle what we reasonably believe to be political disputes or an attempt at one party state.

THE SPIRIT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE CALL FOR CAUTION IN EXCESSIVE LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION IN THE LIGHT OF ITS OBVIOUS PROVISIONS

It is germane to note that in construing the provisions of the Constitution, interpretation must flow from and be in line with the true spirit of the ethos and principles of democracy, upon whose philosophy the Constitution itself is based and founded. We dare say that the true spirit of the CFRN, 1999 (as amended) is to promote constitutional democracy, protect and enhance separation of powers and uphold the rule of law, as espoused by Baron De Montesquieu in 1748. Any situation contrary to this, where in a federating state, a level or arm of government (in this case the federal government) is allowed to suspend any of the federating units, such situation cannot be said to be federalism or even embodying the spirit of the law as enshrined in the 1999 Constitution. Moreover, where the laid down law of a polis (a city state) is clearly written down making it impossible to suspend any of the federating units, the courts should not give in to any invitation to give erroneous, false and excessive liberal interpretations that will stab the Constitution and the true essence of federalism on the chest. Arguably, the evolution of constitutionalism could be said to have predated democracy. As aptly attested to by J. M. Colorner: Constitutions came earlier than democracy. During the late middle-ages and early modern times, Constitutions were mainly devices for establishing rights and limiting powers and functions. See Joseph M. Colorner: “Comparative Constitutions” in the Oxford Handbook of Political Science (2009) @ 179; copiously alluded to in Black’s Law Dictionary 11th Edition 2019.

In line with the ideal reality of John Locke and Thomas Hobbes on the principles of constitutionalism which we now practice as a Nation, government can and should be legally limited in its powers and that its authority or legitimacy depends on its capacity and readiness to observe these limitations. The Supreme Court in giving nod to the essence of constitutionalism in our Constitution, has on numerous occasions, re-echoed the need to ensure that excessive liberalism in constitutional interpretation is not given to the 1999 Constitution in order not to spoil its essence or extend the limit of powers donated by it. In the case of INEC V. MUSA (2003) 3 NWLR (PT. 806) 72, the Apex Court stated the position that a liberal approach to the interpretation of the Constitution is good in relevant situations, but the court cannot do so excessively to the extent that it destroys the fabrics of constitutionalism and constitutionality. All interpretations of the Constitution must bow or kowtow to these twin principles or pillars of constitutional law in our democracy in which the rule of law, democracy’s life blood, triumphs to the egalitarian advantage of Nigeria and its people. Democracy is by choice but once it has been adopted as a system of government, there must be strict compliance with its universal rules and concepts.

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