Bandits’ assault on Katsina mosque

ON Tuesday, August 19, bandits stormed a mosque during dawn prayers, killing dozens of worshippers in Unguwan Mantau, Malumfashi Local Government Area of Katsina State. While official reports confirmed 17 deaths, survivors and independent accounts indicate that more than 50 people may have perished, with families still combing nearby bushes for missing relatives. This chilling massacre underscores yet again the gravity of Nigeria’s security crisis and the urgent need for a decisive policy response. Authorities have described the incident as a reprisal following a confrontation in which local residents ambushed and killed some bandits days earlier. The Katsina State Commissioner for Internal Security, Nasir Muazu, disclosed that the attackers fired indiscriminately on worshippers in the mosque, leaving grief and devastation in their wake. He further noted that security forces had since been deployed, though the perpetrators remain at large.

This tragedy demonstrates the entrenched insecurity that continues to plague Nigeria’s North-West region. It reveals a troubling pattern: communities are left to fend for themselves, isolated from state protection, and subsequently subjected to violent retaliation. In Unguwan Mantau, survivors lamented the absence of security personnel both during and after the attack. Journalists who reached the area reported deserted roads, no official presence, and villagers virtually abandoned to their fate. Even when government officials eventually visited, they addressed the distraught population from the roadside rather than entering the devastated community. This gesture speaks volumes about the disconnect between state authority and rural realities.

Such incidents raise fundamental questions about the efficacy of Nigeria’s security and intelligence architecture. Bandits are not an invisible force. They operate openly, occupy forested territories, and in many cases, are known to the communities and security agencies alike. As Representative Sada Soli observed, these groups control swathes of territory in Katsina, particularly along the Kankara–Malumfashi–Funtua axis bordering Zamfara State. They levy taxes, enforce parallel governance, and move freely without meaningful disruption. That they can repeatedly launch mass-casualty attacks, including on places of worship, underscores a severe intelligence and operational gap. It is not enough for security agencies to intensify operations in the aftermath of each massacre. The Chief of Defence Staff, General Christopher Musa, has described the situation as “disturbing,” but acknowledgment without demonstrable strategic change is insufficient. The persistence of these attacks reveals not just a capacity problem but a policy failure at multiple levels: intelligence gathering, community engagement, inter-agency coordination, and border security.

First, Nigeria must recalibrate its intelligence-led approach to security. Rural communities have repeatedly warned of impending attacks, only for these warnings to be ignored until after tragedy strikes. Building effective intelligence networks that integrate local vigilance with formal security structures is critical. Community-based initiatives are laudable, but without consistent state backing and protection, they merely expose villagers to retaliation. Second, the government must address the proliferation of ungoverned spaces. The forests of Katsina, Zamfara and Sokoto have become sanctuaries for armed groups. Sustained military presence, not sporadic raids, is required to dismantle these sanctuaries. This will demand both manpower and resources, as well as collaboration with local vigilantes who possess knowledge of the terrain. Without denying the state its monopoly on force, structured partnerships between communities and security agencies can bridge the protection gap.

Third, the financial and logistical supply lines of these armed groups must be disrupted. Reports have long suggested that bandit groups benefit from ransom economies, illicit mining, and supply chains that allow them to procure weapons and fuel. A serious security response must therefore include economic measures: regulation of artisanal mining, financial intelligence to trace ransom flows, and stricter control of small arms trafficking across Nigeria’s porous borders. Fourth, accountability is imperative. The optics of repeated massacres followed by condolences but no visible consequences for perpetrators erode public trust in government. Each time survivors are left to bury their dead without seeing justice, confidence in the state diminishes. Public, transparent, and effective prosecutions are necessary to restore faith that the state can defend its citizens.

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Finally, there is a need for stronger regional cooperation. The crisis in Katsina cannot be delinked from instability in Zamfara and beyond. Armed groups exploit porous boundaries, moving seamlessly between states. Security strategies must therefore be regional in scope, coordinated across state lines, and reinforced by federal leadership that treats the North-West as a priority theatre of operations. The Unguwan Mantau attack is not simply another statistic in Nigeria’s long list of tragedies. It is a stark warning that unchecked insecurity is hollowing out state authority. Places of worship, schools and rural farmlands are increasingly under siege, eroding both economic productivity and social cohesion. A government that cannot guarantee the safety of its citizens risks losing legitimacy in the eyes of those it claims to serve.

We extend our condolences to the grieving families of Unguwan Mantau and commend the resilience of communities across Katsina and the wider Northwest who continue to endure unimaginable hardship. But condolences are not a substitute for policy. What is required now is decisive action rooted in intelligence, sustained in commitment, and uncompromising in execution. Anything less will only perpetuate the cycle of bloodshed and leave more villages abandoned to their fate.