How we tried to stop Obasanjo in 1999 —Bamaiyi

A former Chief of Army Staff, General Ishaya Bamaiyi (Rtd) has sensationally revealed a plan championed by him to stop the emergence of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo as the democratically elected President in 1999.

In his autobiography titled: Vindication of a General launched on Thursday in Abuja, a copy of which was obtained by Saturday Tribune, General Bamaiyi revealed how he led an opposition to the move by some serving and retired generals to make Obasanjo president as the country moved towards democratic rule in 1999.

Giving an account of what happened following General Sani Abacha’s death on June 8, 1998 and the politics of succession that followed, Bamaiyi disclosed that soon after General Abdusalami Abubakar became Head of State, he started meeting with Generals Ibrahim Babangida, T. Y. Danjuma and Aliyu Gusau on who the military would hand over power to.

Another key revelation in the book by Bamaiyi was what he called an agreement by the Generals to make General Babangida the successor of President Obasanjo in 2007.

Excerpts:

“My relationship with General Abubakar dates back to the immediate post-civil war era when with a number of officers including Lt SVL Malu and Major JT. Useni we played hockey together in Benin City. Against this backdrop, supporting General Abubakar was the natural thing to do.

Unfortunately, as soon as he became the Commander in Chief, he changed. One day, I went to see him while he was still in Fort IBB. He told me he hoped the job God had given him would not stain our relationship. I was shocked by that statement but did not take it seriously. I told him he was the Commander in Chief and our  relationshion depended on him. He emphasised that he had been assured of my absolute loyalty during his nomination. I added that if at any time he felt threatened by me, I was ready to resign and go home. I thought the matter ended there.

He started holding meetings with Generals Babangida and Aliyu Gusau. I was receiving reports of their getting together. I did not bother myself about such meetings because I knew we were not staying long in government. Unknown to me, General Abubakar had already committed himself to Generals Babangida, TY Danjuma and Aliyu Gusau on General Obasanjo’s coming in to take over from him – a proposal I totally objected to, which I told Generals Abubakar, TY Danjuma and Aliyu Gusau in very clear terms. My stand did not go well with the generals, and Gen. Abubakar started feeling unsafe. He started using some officers, especially from intelligence, to write all sorts of reports against me saying I was too ambitious and wanted to be the Commander in Chief. I expected Gen. Abubakar to know that I had no ambition of becoming Commander in Chief since no one would have stopped me from taking over after General Abacha’s death. One may ask why he did not simply remove me. This could have been because he knew I had total control of the Army, and any move to remove me would have removed him as well; even though he did not trust me, he knew he could not do without me.

“Then came the appointments to determine who his CGS would be. He asked for my suggestions. Out of loyalty and respect for seniority, I mentioned the two most senior officers then in service Major General Rufus Kupolati and AVM Ayinla, who was a minister, Abubakar told me that Kupolati from Kogi was from the north, just like him. This was true, but I thought Ayinla, as the most senior officer, was most qualified. He told me he would think about it. The next day, he told me that he had decided to make Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) Mike Akhigbe the CGS and make AVM Ayinla the CNS. He said he would make me the CDS and Minister of Defence. I did not comment on this. After some days, he sent for me again and said he would keep me in the Army as COAS. I believe he had discussions with some friend and was advised to hold the Ministry of Defence. He asked for a suggestion for a CDS, which should be outside the Army. I knew AVM Daggash was also a close friend of Abubakar and suggested him, Gen. Abubakar immediately agreed.

We went to ministerial appointments in which some ministers were brought back while others were dropped. We agreed that Gen. PN Aziza was to be the minister of Transport, and Abubakar had me inform Aziza. Surprisingly, when the ministerial appointments were released, General Aziza was not the minister of transport. I now realised that a man’s true character is only known when he has power and money.

“It is interesting to note that as COAS during Abubakar’s time, I never received anything for the Nigerian Army. For every project I planned, I always kept funds and was able to complete all of them. I left a cash and bank balance of about two billion naira for Gen. Malu, who succeeded me. I am glad General Malu openly said this because he was also starved of funds by the Obasanjo administration. The funds I left for him enabled him to run the army.

“It is evident that Abubakar was being misled from outside the government about me. This led to his taking me along when he visited the United Kingdom, the US, and France for fear of being overthrown by me – a fear his advisers put into him. He should have known I was not the ambitious officer people said I was. If I had been, he wouldn’t have been the Head of State. It was surprising that he could think of me ever overthrowing him.

“As a result of the fear that was put into Abubakar’s mind, he did not do anything for the Army in the one year he was Commander in Chief. He cancelled the purchase of motorcycles for soldiers that had been approved by General Abacha and fraudulently approved some  purchases for the Army through the office of the CGS without the knowledge of the Army. General Abubakar and his group inside and outside the military arranged to carry out an investigation into the alleged criminal activities during General Abacha’s time, which included assassinations and attempted assassinations. They used soldiers like Sgt. Rogers Jabila.

“These investigations were carried out without my knowledge as COAS, even though my soldiers were being investigated. General Abubakar handed over these reports with a strong recommendation that I be detained and be kept in custody for a long time so democracy could survive because I did not support the emergence of an ex-military officer as president. He was supported by some northern generals who believed one of them would take over from Obasanjo after one term of four years. It was alleged that Obasanjo had promised General Babangida that he would succeed him.

“One of those who brought in General Obasanjo to become the president of Nigeria has now agreed that General Obasanjo has been a failure, as reported by the Daily Sun Newspaper of Wednesday, 17 August, 2011, Vol. 6, No. 2160. General Babangida was quoted as saying that Obasanjo’s administration lacked foresight and imagination, and he accused Obasanjo of wasting the economic affluence of the country. I stand vindicated for opposing these generals who supported my arrest and detention for opposing Obasanjo as the president of Nigeria in 1999. I paid the price for my stand, but Nigeria is paying a higher price for Obasanjo’s wickedness to Nigeria, especially the northern part of the country. The generals now know better, and I believe they know they cannot play God. Sometimes when you think you are the wisest person, you turn out to be the greatest fool.

General Abubakar prepared and handed over his report to General Obasanjo’s team, dated June 1998. This means he prepared the report as soon as he was sworn in as the Commander inChief in June 1998. The Obasanjo government then prepared its report dated 26 July, 1999. Abubakar’s report was posted through PSD/OPS/PSO INT to the NSA in 1999. In the letter to the NSA, General Gusau, it clearly stated that the report was handed over to them for democracy to thrive in the Third Republic. The report accused me of many things,  including the following:

1. That I was dissatisfied with the appointment of Abubakar as C in C.
2. That I was working with the opposition and foreign embassies to create the state of insecurity in the country. The report accused the US government of having set aside US $50 million toward this destabilising objective. Out of this money, the report stated, I had collected US $10 million in March 1998, and I disbursed the money to my loyal officers.”

Abacha’s death

Only God and those responsible would be able to tell the cause of Abacha’s death or provide details of the fact that he died in Aso Rock Villa. One can only mention aspects that concern him, I am one of those who do not believe Abacha’s death was natural. It caused more jubilation than sorrow for many people. All the leads that would have been investigated were not followed. The sentence ‘We killed Abacha’ was discovered in one security officer’s house in his own handwriting, but the matter was not investigated because anything that had to do with Abacha was evil to the Obasanjo government regardless of the fact that their actions were worse than those of Abacha’s government.

“On 5 June 1998, I represented the Commander-in-Chief at the graduation ceremony of the Junior Division at the Command and Staff College in Jaji, Kaduna. I left Kaduna at 5:00 p.m. for Lagos and was in my official quarters by 6:30. At 7:00, I received a call  from Lt. Col. Abdullahi, ADC to General Abacha, about the Commander in Chief wanting to see me that night. I told my wife the fact that I would be on my way to Abuja to see  General Abacha. She looked at me and said, ‘I hope these people will not kill you.’ I said, “You have started your talk.” I phoned my ADC, Major Chechet, and told him to tell the boys we were proceeding to Abuja. By 7:30 p.m., we were on our way to the Airport. We were in Abuja by 9:00, and at 10:00 p.m. I called Lt Col. Abdullah and told him I was ready to see the Commander in Chief. He promised to call me when the Commander in Chief was in the living room. At midnight, I called again; Abdullah told me he was yet to come down to the sitting room. At 2:00 a.m., he told me the Commander in Chief had gone out, so I went to bed.

“The next day, I waited until noon to call, and the ADC again told me that General Abacha was not up and that he would call me whenever he was awake. I did not hear anything until 8:00 p.m. when I decided to call again, and he told me the Commander in Chief had visitors and would call me as soon as they had left. My meeting was stalled in this way until Monday morning, 8 June. At 8:00 a.m., I was called by an operator in the Villa who said the Commander in Chief was ready to see me. I dressed in uniform, got my security officer, Capt. Bature, and my security boys, and headed for the Villa. The first shock I got was that I was told to drop my security at the gate and go in alone. I insisted on going in with my security. After a long argument, I was allowed to do so. I entered the office and met General Abubakar, the CDS. After I paid my compliments, I asked him why he was in mufti. He said the call was urgent. After a while, Major Hamza Al Mustapha came in and told us the C in C was going to see us in his office. Later, the following senior government officials joined us: the Chief Justice of Nigeria (CJN), Justice Uwais; the Secretary to the Federal Government (SGF), Alhaji Gidado Idris; and a minister, Alhaji Dalhatu.

“Again, Mustapha came and told us the Commander in Chief was going to see us in his office. Up to that time, none of us had been aware of the death of General Abacha. Col. Buba Marwa, Brig. Gen. Sabo, the DMI, and Brigadier General Yakubu Muazu were already in the residence.

“Col. Marwa was already there because an aircraft was said to have been sent to bring him from Lagos. When the IGP went into the Villa, he asked about Gen. Abubakar and me and was told no one knew where we were. He decided to come to our usual waiting room and there met all the people I mentioned above. I noticed the surprise on his face. He invited all of us into the residence. When we got into the main living room, the IGP told us about the death of General Abacha. This was at 11:00 a.m. General Useni was in his office, unaware of the death of his boss. General Abubakar eventually invited him to the Villa; he knew of Abacha’s death when he arrived. Failure by officers in the Villa to inform the CDS and the COAS on the death of the C in C on 8 June, 1998 after keeping them waiting to see the C in C from Friday until his death on Monday is difficult to understand, especially when they were kept with some senior government officials waiting to see C in C when the officers knew the C in C was dead – it was questionable and suspicious. Anything could have happened that day which could have resulted to blood shed but for God’s intervention through General Abacha’s brother, Major Abdulkadir Abacha (rtd), who restrained some officers from taking any action that would have caused serious problems to this nation on that day.

I wanted General Abacha to be given a full military burial, but his family refused. Of course the family’s wishes had to be considered, which was why General Abacha was given a quiet burial at his private residence in Kano. The truth of Abacha’s death may never be known because the evidence was lost from the beginning.

Abacha’s succession

“General Abacha died in the early hours of 8 June 1998. His family decided he would not be given a military burial and had to be buried at night in Kano. Before leaving Abuja for Kano with the remains of General Abacha, I observed that some officers were not ready to go to Kano for the burial. They included Brigadier General Sabo (DMI), Brigadier General Muazu (Comd Gds Bde), and Col. MB Marwa, Military Administrator, Lagos State. At the airport, I had to order Marwa to go into the aircraft to proceed to Kano. At that time I had already given orders to Lt. Col. Mana, CO 81 Bn Keffi to ensure no officer took any step against the government; he was not to take orders from anyone but me. He was ordered to deal with anyone who made any move to take over the government while we were in Kano.

“We returned from Kano and went into the Chambers to decide who would become the Commander in Chief. While in Kano, some senior officers had decided the COAS would take over the government. I had never been interested in any political office, had avoided them so far, and had no intention of taking up the position of Commander in Chief. I made this clear to the senior officers who insisted I should take over, including Generals SVL Malu, Magashi, and Aziza. I was also aware of some junior officers who were against my taking over as Commander in Chief because they knew I would not tolerate them in service.

The problem I had convincing the senior officers to allow General A.A. Abubakar to take over had to do with his record of convinction by a court-martial presided over by the late Col. Nenger sometime between 1970 and 1972, when he tampered with soldiers’ salaries and was convicted by court-martial and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. Fortunately for Abubakar, his classmates at the Provincial Secondary School, Bida were at Army Headquarters. They worked it out and reduced the sentence to a reprimand. This was possible because at that time the Nigerian Army had no Legal Department because the Army did not have enough lawyers to handle one. Confirmation of court-martial cases was left to the Army Administrative Branch. That is how Abubakar’s conviction was changed from two years of imprisonment to a reprimand. In that case, he was not dismissed or reduced in rank, but a reprimand in the Nigerian Army is a conviction. Officers were not prepared to accept an officer with a record of conviction as a Head of State. The issue of succession now fell to me, and some of the commanding officers and the staff told me I had to take charge to save the situation. I told them I believed in Abubakar, and we should support him.

“While this was going on, some junior officers were campaigning against Useni and me. They believed that once I took over, they would be in trouble, but I never had any intention of taking any political post. I had joined the army not for political post. I had joined the army not for politics.

“When I told the senior officers I would not take over as Commander in Chief, the officers close to me said I was going to regret this action. I did not believe them because General Abubakar and I had been very close since we had been Lieutenants and played hockey for 2 Mechanised Division with Generals Shehu Yar’Adua and Useni. As soon as we got into the chambers, Abubakar started distributing papers as if there were going to be an election. Meanwhile, people were there with Bibles and Qurans because they did not know who the Commander in Chief was going to be.

“It took a lot of persuasion to get the officers to accept General Abubakar. This was why during the swearing in of the Commander in Chief, the Quran and the Bible were brought into the chambers unknown to many officers and the PRC members. After the discussion, no decision was reached because papers were passed around for officers to nominate a Commander in Chief. I knew that problems could arise from there. When it was my turn, I got up and announced we had all agreed that General Abubakar was to be the Commander in Chief and had been promoted to a four-star General. Abubakar was sitting next to me. That was how we succeeded in making Gen. Abubakar the Commander in Chief in spite of his record of conviction.

“I am glad that in the minutes of the PRC emergency meeting of 8 June, 1998 at the Council chambers, Asokoro, Abuja, Mr T. Fagbemi, who took the minutes, stated, ‘a member  supported succession by hierarchy, then he announced the CDS Major General A.A. Abubakar as the HOS, C in C. The member suggested further that he should be promoted to the rank of a four-star General. This member was General I.R. Bamaiyi (COAS).’ Questions were asked about why Lt. Gen. J.T. Useni, the most senior officer  when Gen. Abacha died, was not made Commander in Chief. Many put the blame on some of us at that time. It was difficult to sell Useni for a number of reasons.

“First and foremost, General Useni was the last officer to be with late General Abacha when he died, and there were many insinuation of his  involvement in Abacha’s death. These were mere insinuations; I believe General Useni had no hand in General Abacha’s death. I became more convinced when, at the Oputa panel, a document recovered from a security officer’s house in the officer’s handwriting, stated clearly, “We killed Abacha.’ This document was handed over to the Oputa panel but was only mentioned in a corner of the Oputa panel report. Since it was about General Abacha, the government did not care to investigate the matter, nor did the panel make any recommendation about it. I strongly believe that if this document had been investigated, the truth of General Abacha’s death would have been known.

“The second reason was that when politicians and some junior military officers were planning to make Abacha succeed himself, General Useni was said to have been too involved in the succession plan. Although General Abacha did not show that he knew and approved of it, I believe he was aware and did not oppose it. We could not have supported General J.T. Useni to succeed Abacha because of national interest and consideration of the Abacha family.