The political stalemate in Sudan

IN December 2018, after rising inflation forced former Sudanese military despot Omar al-Bashir to announce a new raft of austerity measures, thousands of ordinary Sudanese, irate at the skyrocketing prices of bread and fuel, took to the streets. The petulant reaction of the former military ruler was an early indication that he expected the protests to peter out in no time. But despite the regime’s show of power– more than a dozen protesters were killed and thousands seized by government forces– the protesters dug deep, and they continued to hold their nerve even after al-Bashir had, in a final throw of the dice, declared a national state of emergency, sacking the federal cabinet and substituting state governors with members of the armed forces.

Things got to a head in the first week of April after thousands of protesters stormed the army headquarters in Khartoum and, daring the junta’s armed troops to shoot, vowed not to evacuate until al-Bashir had resigned. Within a week, the man who had seized power in a military coup in June 1989 and who would, over the next three decades, preside over one of the bloodiest and most tyrannical regimes in postcolonial African history, was gone.

While protests over the rising prices of bread, fuel, and other everyday items were the immediate trigger for al-Bashir’s deposition, there is no doubt that frustration with the regime had been building up over the years. As military dictator, al-Bashir did not exactly endear himself either to the Sudanese people or the international community. As a matter of fact, up until his removal, he was wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in relation to his role in the conflict in the Darfur region which claimed an estimated 300,000 lives and displaced millions more.

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The depth of his domestic unpopularity is seen in the character of the coalition that mobilised to force him out of office. For instance, the Sudanese Professional Association, the umbrella body coordinating the protests, comprises doctors, lawyers, teachers, and other middle and upper middle professionals from all parts of the Sudanese society. Other active political opposition groups include the Forces for Freedom and Change, Sudan Call, Consensus Forces and other civil society groups. But to focus on these groups, vital as they are, is to miss one of the unique elements of the ongoing protests, which is the role of women, young and old.

When the dust finally settles on the protests and the protesters have secured major concessions regarding democratic rule, the faces that will be remembered are the faces of 22-year-old Alaa Salah, an engineering and architecture undergraduate; 56-year-old Awadia Mahmoud Koko, who has been preparing meals for the protesters; 34-year-old Halima Ishaq, who was forced to live in an Internally Displaced People’s (IDP) camp after her village was sacked by pro-government militia; and the activist from the Nuba Mountains, Marsiliya Yakub, whose refrain, capturing the sentiment of majority of female protesters, has been: “We need a fair country. We have suffered a lot. More than men in many cases. Women should be in the centre of any government.”

While the representatives of the protesters continue to negotiate with the transitional military council under the leadership of Lt. Gen Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman Burhan, it is difficult to say precisely where the pendulum of power will swing. As the political impasse continues, Sudan’s resurgent civil society would do well to look into how similar stalemates in other parts of the continent were resolved. We stand in solidarity with the ordinary people of Sudan and endorse their sentiment for a democratic, just, progressive, and economically prosperous future.