Suitable Constitution

State without a plebiscite would amount to flouting their wishes, and denying the national group concerned the right of self-determination.

Secondly, even if the majority of the people in the linguistic group in question had voted against being included in the existing constituent State in the first instance, it is not unlikely that practical experience would convince them of the wisdom of remaining in the existing constituent State at least for some time further. To constitute them, therefore, into a constituent State without a plebiscite would be contrary to the wishes of the majority of the people.

(4) Where it is proposed to bring two or more minority linguistic groups together in a new constituent State, or to redraw or confirm the boundary between two existing constituent States so as thereby to transfer the citizens of one constituent State to the other or divide the nationals of one national group between the said two constituent States – then, in such circumstances, a plebiscite should be held to determine the wishes of:

(i) the minority linguistic units which are to be brought together in the proposed constituent State;

(ii) the citizens who are affected by the proposed transfer trom one constituent State to another, and

(iii) that section of one national unit that is being transferred to or confirmed in another constituent State different from that to which the main stock of the said national group belongs.

The present Constitution of Nigeria provides that not less than 60% of those who vote in a plebiscite should support the creation of a new constituent State or the readjustment of inter-State boundaries.

We are of the opinion that this provision is very good and should remain, and be applied in future plebiscites for the.creation of new constituent States, and the adjustment of State boundaries.

FOURTH: In some weighty quarters, principles for the creation of new constituent States in Nigeria have been enunciated as follows:

(i) No one State should be in a position to dominate or control the Central Government.

(ii) Each State should form one compact geographical area.

(iii) Administrative convenience, the facts of history, and the wishes of the people concerned must be taken into account.

(iv)Each State should be in a position to discharge effectively the functions allocated to Regional Governments.

It will be seen that all the above so-called principles have been fully covered by us. Our only objection -and it is an important one – is that it is wrong, extremely misleading, and dangerous to regard them as principles – that is, as the fundamental bases or laws – for the creation of new constituent States in Nigeria. They do not do, and must not pretend to do, any more than supply the guidelines for anyone who may be charged with the responsibility of applying the multi-lingual principle which we have declared. To illustrate the danger inherent in regarding the aforestated principles as the fundamental bases for the creation of new constituent States, let us imagine that a number of persons, working separately and unknown to one another, are asked to apply the said principles to Nigeria. We make bold to assert that they will all produce results which will be widely divergent from one another.

It would be quite accidental if any two of such results corresponded. Whereas if the same persons are asked to apply the multilingual principle, subject to the working guidance which we have laid down with regard to the minor national groups, they will produce results which will be absolutely identical in respect of the ten major national units, and of the nine minority linguistic groups in the East. With respect to the 30 minor linguistic groups in he North, the results will largely correspond.

Any proposition by the aid of which we cannot reach exact results does not qualify for the scientific halo of principle. Without such political considerations as we have borne in mind in dealing with the minor linguistic groups, the multi-lingual principle, in its application to Nigeria, will produce exact results. It will equally produce exact results, if applied to any other country with more or less the same national diversity as Nigeria. In contrast, however, the so-called principles which form the subjectmatter of these remarks, cannot produce exact results.

FIFTH: Lagos, as a Federal Territory so-called, has since 1954 always been, and will for ever remain, a constant bone of contention in Nigerian politics. The reasons for this are not at all far to seek. Of the approximately 660,000 inhabitants of Lagos, more than 75% are Yoruba. Of this 75% about 80% are non-Lagosian Yoruba – that is Yoruba people who are not members of the Eko (or Lagos) tribe. Geographically, the territory of Lagos and the rest of Yoruba land are contiguous. From this brief analysis, it is clear that, theoretically, the tendency to cohere must be present between the people of Lagos and those of Western Nigeria. Empirically, this has been exactly the case over the years. The tendency to cohere has grown stronger and stronger with the passage of time; and every effort to stifle it has been persistently and relentlessly resisted all along the line.

On the other hand, three important factors deserve to be borne in mind. The first is that Lagos is the capital of the Federation of Nigeria, and has been so since 1914. The second is that all non-Lagosian Nigerians, and particularly all non- Yoruba Nigerians, have at all material times been led to believe that Lagos is their second home. The third is that non- Yoruba Nigerians in and outside Lagos desire strongly, though misguidedly, that Lagos should continue to remain a Federal Territory, because they entertain fears, which are unfounded, that its merger with Western Nigeria would endanger their interests. And about 25% of the population of Lagos is composed of such non- Yoruba Nigerians.

Now, if these factors were ignored, and the multi-lingual principle were strictly applied, Lagos and the rest of Yorubaland should form one constituent State, since the indigenes of Lagos are a Yoruba tribe. But if this were done, the feelings of non- Yoruba Nigerians would be exacerbated, and their fears whether genuine or not would be magnified out of proportion. As a result, the peace and tranquillity of the compact and extremely sensitive and alert Lagos community would be seriously disturbed. At the same time, however, it would be criminal folly of the worst type to continue to ignore the powerful social forces which are at work among the Yoruba inhabitants of Lagos (indigenous and non-indigenous alike), and their orientation towards their kith and kin in Western Nigeria.

Furthermore, because of the position of Lagos as a Federal Territory, indigenous Lagosians suffer grave constitutional disabilities which practically reduce them to the status of ‘second- class’ citizens. For example, while every Nigerian who lives in Lagos, unless he is an indigenous Lagosian, has an opportunity of seeking election to two legislative assemblies, and of serving on two Governments – those of the composite State, and of the constituent

State from which he originates – an indigenous Lagosian can only seek election to the Parliament and serve on the Government of the composite State. Besides, experience has shown that even this single chance, as well as the opportunity to serve on the Lagos City Council, is recognized and protected only by the right-thinking members of the Yoruba national group to which he belongs.

In view of all that we have said, and specifically in order to protect the inalienable rights of the indigenous Lagosians in particular, to assuage the feelings of Yoruba people in general, and to allay the fears of non- Yoruba Nigerians, we strongly urge that the claim by the Yoruba for a merger of Lagos with Western Nigeria, and that by non-Yoruba Nigerians for Lagos to continue as a Federal Territory, should both be abandoned. And we propose that Lagos should be converted into a separate constituent State, instead.

A Lagos constituent State which is only conterminous with the present jurisdiction of the Lagos City Council will be as viable as any State in the world. But the future development and expansion of Lagos as a major Nigerian port, not to mention its importance as the Federal Capital, demand that, if possible, portions of the adjoining territory of Western Nigeria, such as Ajerorni District Council Area, and parts of Ikeja Division, should be merged with the L. C. C. area to form a Lagos constituent State.

As long as Lagos remains the capital of Nigeria, the Central Government must of a necessity have a special interest in the physical development of the Territory as well as in the kind of relationship which exists between it and the Authority in charge of the administration of Lagos. The problems which will thus arise should not be too difficult to solve. There are many successful precedents. Among them are Ottawa, Moscow, Bonn, and Belgrade.

It only remains for us to emphasize that in organizing Lagos together with Ajerorni District Council Area and parts of Ikeja Division into a new constituent State, a nlebiscite should be conducted in the areas which it is proposed she ild be included in the said State.

SIXTH: The demand for the merger of the Yoruba tribes in IIorin and Kabba Divisions with the rest of Yorubaland is a long-standing one. Since they are Yoruba, they automatically belong to Western Nigeria under the multi-lingual principle. But the dominant Hausal Fulani of the Northern Region lay claim to these areas and the people therein, on the strength of their alleged military conquest some 146 years ago. The British, in pursuit of their selfish imperialist interests,

recognized this spurious claim. But today, we do not think that any enlightened and intelligent member of the HausaiFulani national group will insist on this preposterous, insulting, and false claim. In the circumstance, it is unnecessary to demonstrate the historical falsity, or the political injudiciousness, of the claim.

In keeping. however, with our third principle on the subject, a plebiscite should be held in the two divisions of IIorin and Kabba to determine whether or not the people do truly desire to remain where they are, or to be merged with Western Nigeria. We now come to the important issue of division of functions as between the composite and the constituent State. We are of the opinion that this should be done so as to vest:

(1) certain specified powers exclusively in the Central Authority;

(2) certain specified powers concurrently in the Central and Regional Authorities; and

(3) residual powers exclusively in the Regional Authorities.

There are a few protagonists of a Unitary Constitution for Nigeria who <are prepared to tolerate or even support a Federal Constitution, if the above order is reversed and residuary functions are vested exclusively in the Central Authority. As we have seen, Canada is a good precedent for this procedure. But, in this connection, we are in honesty bound to point out that some political analysts have reported that the Canadian arrangement has led to a lot offriction between the Central and Provincial Authorities, and that there is a clear tendency that the latter are winning, and waxing stronger at the expense of the Central Authority.

Be that as it may. Our considered view is that Nigeria should keep in step, in this matter, with the U.S.A.,Australia, Switzerland, and such-like countries. Besides, on merit, it is more desirable and wiser to vest residuary functions in the constituent States. We have three reasons in support of this proposition.

Firstly, whilst by the exercise of reasonable prudence and foresight one could draw up a comprehensive list of subjects for the composite State, which will hold good for half a century or more hence, one would need the divine gift of prophecy to do the same in respect of a constituent State list of subjects. For instance, omissions were discovered in the Regional list of the Macpherson Constitution three months after its introduction. It took much longer than that time to supply the omissions.

Secondly, since matters on the Exclusive Federal List are invariably of country-wide interest, any required addition to the list can be much more easily inserted by amendment to the constitution, than would be the case in regard to subjects in the constituent State list, which are usually of local interest. Here, it must be emphasized that ‘local interest’ means what it says. What is of vital interest to one constituent State may be unheard of in, or even anathema to, the other constituent States. Now, if such an amendment to the Constitution is to be made with the concurrence of the people in a referendum, then unless a matter of interest to a constituent State is, at the same time, of interest to all or a majority of the other constituent States, an amendment to the Constitution to let it in would be almost impossible.

Thirdly, as the fountain of financial resources for all the Governments of the country, the Central Authority is in a powerful and unique position. It can, as other Central Authorities are wont to do, use its financial power to exercise forceful or even forcible persuasive influence on the constituent States to get what it wants. No constituent State can ever enjoy this felicitous position of influence on the other constituent States, let alone on the Central Government.

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